Demotion of Safety Culture in Lab Relocations: from sewage to biohazards, Penn State denies its role in creating unsafe move conditions--from the top-down
On August 18th, 2016, the timetable for the demolition of the former Chemical Engineering building, Fenske Laboratory, was moved up significantly to September 23rd---only 36 days later---from a now-contested planned exit date between October 31st, 2016 and January 2017. Despite capital raised for the demolition and reconstruction costs of this building totaling in excess of $144M and another $5.4M set aside for temporary space expenses alone, minimal support was provided to laboratories to meet the demands of relocation to temporary space; faculty were mandated to use their personal time, federally-supported research personnel, and research incentive funds to accomplish the move. Support provided by the Office of Physical Plant was highly constrained, a request for support specifically to meet safety constraints was denied by the Chemical Engineering Department Head, and support otherwise was highly insufficient.
As a result, two month-long experiments were ruined; students and staff were exposed to hazardous conditions including weeks of 15-24-hour days of intense physical labor and exposure to chemical and biological hazards. Staff member repercussions included but were not limited to mental breakdown, depression, and physical symptoms like severe weight loss, vomiting, and aspiration. A visiting scholar’s 6-month visit, meant to foster collaborative research, was completely disrupted by the effort to move and relocate. A faculty member’s sabbatical was delayed, subsequently limiting his sought-after input on a $40M National Laboratory research proposal, which was ultimately not awarded.
Despite these outcomes, the Office of Ethics & Compliance (OEC), reporting directly to the Provost, ruled that allegations of an expedited timeline, hazardous environment, and lack of support were unfounded. In turn, OEC contends that the blame is solely based on the failures of individual faculty researchers. This conclusion was reached by cherrypicking e-mail contents, blaming faculty, and limiting their request for information solely to the subject of the timeline of the move. A general absence of emails communicating the timeline for 2.5 months beyond “Fall 2016” was ignored. E-mails indicating a later timeline were also “discounted” because they were later contradicted by the aforementioned August 15th e-mail entitled “Moving to Greenberg has been moved up” with the first mention of a September 23rd move-out date. The college provided the department’s overburdened dual-functioning building supervisor and safety officer with recognition as a “staff star” and, after further safety violations in 2018, a staff performance award.
Ultimately, decisions made by administrators and leaders at every level---throughout departments, the college, the Office of Environmental Health & Safety, the Office of the Physical Plant, the Office of Ethics & Compliance, and the Provost---all, at minimum, point to a safety culture that does NOT approach the minimum guidelines set forth by the Association of Public and Land-Grant Universities (APLU). In fact, in lieu of safety culture is a culture of endangerment that is propagated by a focus on denial, minimization, blame--at minimum. I hold the opinion that Penn State was negligent in its duty to provide a safe work environment. Looking toward the relocation of the chemical engineering department into the new Chemical & Biomedical Engineering (CEBME) building in 2019 (over the forthcoming weeks and months), the outlook, therefore, does not look promising.
While there may be some changes to safety procedure and even gestures of support that would seem positive taken at face value, I contend that they are not. Offset by the insistence, including by OEC, that no failures having been made by the department or university--just individual labs--during the 2016 Fenske evacuation, any subsequent improvements would merely point to the university’s awareness that safety standards of the Fenske evacuation were woefully underwhelming--if not outright negligent--but nonetheless a preference to “sweep under the rug” past failures. This reflects the university’s pattern to increase the university’s ability to negate liability by pushing more responsibility onto faculty rather than focus on meaningful mechanisms towards stakeholder engagement, support, safety, etc.
To me, Penn State’s actions reflect a post-Sandusky era that tragically have devolved to legally “protecting” the university by preserving administrators and public perception--rather than serving the majority of Penn State stakeholders and preserving the university mission or values of integrity and personal responsibility that were once synonymous with Penn State. Herein, I first provide a rebuttal of OEC’s denial of Dr. Curtis’ allegations of expedited timelines and lack of support. Secondly, I provide the outcomes that I hope arise from this exposė of Penn State’s safety culture.
PDF displayed below via scribd platform also available at THIS LINK and the download link below.
As a result, two month-long experiments were ruined; students and staff were exposed to hazardous conditions including weeks of 15-24-hour days of intense physical labor and exposure to chemical and biological hazards. Staff member repercussions included but were not limited to mental breakdown, depression, and physical symptoms like severe weight loss, vomiting, and aspiration. A visiting scholar’s 6-month visit, meant to foster collaborative research, was completely disrupted by the effort to move and relocate. A faculty member’s sabbatical was delayed, subsequently limiting his sought-after input on a $40M National Laboratory research proposal, which was ultimately not awarded.
Despite these outcomes, the Office of Ethics & Compliance (OEC), reporting directly to the Provost, ruled that allegations of an expedited timeline, hazardous environment, and lack of support were unfounded. In turn, OEC contends that the blame is solely based on the failures of individual faculty researchers. This conclusion was reached by cherrypicking e-mail contents, blaming faculty, and limiting their request for information solely to the subject of the timeline of the move. A general absence of emails communicating the timeline for 2.5 months beyond “Fall 2016” was ignored. E-mails indicating a later timeline were also “discounted” because they were later contradicted by the aforementioned August 15th e-mail entitled “Moving to Greenberg has been moved up” with the first mention of a September 23rd move-out date. The college provided the department’s overburdened dual-functioning building supervisor and safety officer with recognition as a “staff star” and, after further safety violations in 2018, a staff performance award.
Ultimately, decisions made by administrators and leaders at every level---throughout departments, the college, the Office of Environmental Health & Safety, the Office of the Physical Plant, the Office of Ethics & Compliance, and the Provost---all, at minimum, point to a safety culture that does NOT approach the minimum guidelines set forth by the Association of Public and Land-Grant Universities (APLU). In fact, in lieu of safety culture is a culture of endangerment that is propagated by a focus on denial, minimization, blame--at minimum. I hold the opinion that Penn State was negligent in its duty to provide a safe work environment. Looking toward the relocation of the chemical engineering department into the new Chemical & Biomedical Engineering (CEBME) building in 2019 (over the forthcoming weeks and months), the outlook, therefore, does not look promising.
While there may be some changes to safety procedure and even gestures of support that would seem positive taken at face value, I contend that they are not. Offset by the insistence, including by OEC, that no failures having been made by the department or university--just individual labs--during the 2016 Fenske evacuation, any subsequent improvements would merely point to the university’s awareness that safety standards of the Fenske evacuation were woefully underwhelming--if not outright negligent--but nonetheless a preference to “sweep under the rug” past failures. This reflects the university’s pattern to increase the university’s ability to negate liability by pushing more responsibility onto faculty rather than focus on meaningful mechanisms towards stakeholder engagement, support, safety, etc.
To me, Penn State’s actions reflect a post-Sandusky era that tragically have devolved to legally “protecting” the university by preserving administrators and public perception--rather than serving the majority of Penn State stakeholders and preserving the university mission or values of integrity and personal responsibility that were once synonymous with Penn State. Herein, I first provide a rebuttal of OEC’s denial of Dr. Curtis’ allegations of expedited timelines and lack of support. Secondly, I provide the outcomes that I hope arise from this exposė of Penn State’s safety culture.
PDF displayed below via scribd platform also available at THIS LINK and the download link below.
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